Question 2: G.E. Moore’s Theory of the Nature of Ethics
In “The Subject Matter of Ethics” Moore explains his theory of meta-ethics. Meta-ethics is a branch of analytic philosophy that focuses and analyzes the foundation and standing of morality. Simply put, it categorizes what is considered “good” and “bad”. Moore defines ethics as, fundamentally a set of moral values that are catered to a specific set/group of people. He believes that the business of ethics is to, “discuss such questions and such statements to argue what is the true answer… morality of actions as true or false”( Moore 1903, pg. 439). Moore’s purpose of this theory is to give meaning and morality to his statements as well as determine if they are either true or false. This paper will analyze and compare Moore’s theory of ethics, its definition of “goodness”, and his criticisms towards logical positivists such as Ayer.
Moore breaks ethics down into 3 main branches. Normative Ethics, which is concerned with general issues about how we should and should not behave (i.e. The Golden Rule). Applied Ethics, which is concerned with specific ethical problems (such as working conditions for workers). Lastly, Meta-Ethics (what Moore is the most focused on), which is concerned with high-level issues about the nature of ethics. Meta-Ethics focuses on ethical and moral statements and their meaning. Moore’s Meta-Ethics main commitments include moral realism and non-naturalism. Moral realism is taking ethical statements (i.e. “X is wrong” so “we have a duty to do Y”) and objectifying them as true or false. We are capable of what these objective ethical facts are. Non-naturalism is taking ethical facts which are neither reducible to or inferable from natural facts. We can only know these facts from intuition. Moore’s purpose of ethics is to categorize everyday ethical judgments (such as, “that guy is mean” or “that is such a good man”) and to argue if it is true or false. Meta-ethics is separated into cognitivism and non-cognitivism. Cognitivism is moral statements that are either true or false. Basically, statements that express different beliefs (i.e. “abortion is wrong” merely explains my view towards abortion). Non-cognitivism denies that a moral statement is either true or false. It in a sense means that you are expressing your disapproval of a statement or are commanding (so when you say “abortion is wrong”, it is merely your disapproval).
In order to define ethics Moore first determined what is common in all ethical judgments. Breaking judgments down into what is ‘good’ and what is ‘bad’. How should these be defined, if it can be defined at all? This is one of the most fundamental questions about ethics. Moore explains, “For when we say that a man is good, we commonly mean that he acts rightly… And this discussion of human conduct is, in fact, that with which the name ‘Ethics’ is most intimately associated” (Moore 1903, pg. 439). We explain good as someone who acts in the ‘right’ way and bad as someone who has acted ‘wrongly’. He is explaining that the definition is very general that has derived from actions. Utilitarians, Bentham and Mill used the terms ‘pleasure’ or ‘happiness’ to define ‘goodness’. They are in a sense reducing ‘goodness’ to natural properties (i.e. needs, wants, or pleasures). Unlike simplistic words complex words can be broken down into key parts. “Definitions of the kind that I was asking for, definitions which describe the real nature of the object or notion denoted by a word” (Moore 1903, pg. 442). Moore uses the example ‘horse’, you can explain the different properties and qualities of the horse. Horse has hoofs, walks on four legs, and is a mammal. Moore argues that ‘good’ is a sign of something that is both simple and indefinable. You can not break ‘good’ down any further, you can only substitute it. He says this because if ‘good’ is merely happiness or pleasure; then the statements that we can produce using ‘good’ become expressive or descriptive. This means that we would just be asserting what is the case rather than what ought to be the case (this is called naturalistic fallacy). For example, the statements, “something that makes you happy is good” or simply “pleasure is good”. We would be asserting that something that makes you happy is good. This will always bring up the question, why is being happy good? So in a sense when we ‘discuss’ good, we will simply discuss how a person would use the word good, rather than say what good actually is. Moore also has some objections about naturalism, explaining that it offers no reasoning. “My objections to Naturalism are then, in the first place, that it offers no reason at all… it is a cause of acceptance of false principles” (Moore 1903,