Taylor Bearden
Ethics
Prof. Williams
Fall 2017
First Paper Assignment - Rationalization
“Notice that the last two steps of rationalizing are surprisingly similar to values clarification. Rather than have our emotions follow reason, we submit our reason to our errant emotional desires. Values clarification says, “I desire it, therefore it is good for me.” Rationalization says, “I desire it, therefore, find some way that it is good.” Precisely this role reversal – making reason the servant of the emotions – marks rationalization. The proper order of things, according to Aquinas, is that reason perceives the good, and then emotions follow. One’s mental house is disordered when the reverse is true. Of course, consulting our emotions is often appropriate. If I prefer chocolate ice cream to vanilla, then I may go along with this desire. Choosing between flavors of ice cream (usually) has no moral significance; since reason recognizes this fact, following my desires in such a decision is perfectly rational. Reason is still in control, for it says that the true good perceived by reason, then we should not submit to the desire; rather, the desire should submit to reason.” (Steven J. Jensen, Living the Good Life, p 26)
The core argument from this passage is a Disjunctive Syllogism having the following form:
(Implied) First Premise: Either reason ought to follow desire or desire ought to follow reason.
Second Premise: Reason ought not to follow desire.
Conclusion: Therefore, desire ought to follow reason.
Argument Explanation
In Jensen’s first implied premise, he states in the first disjunct that “rationalization” is recommended when “reason follows desire”. Reason is understood as a man’s tool for understanding with the use of his senses, which is how we manipulate facts and opinions, and gain knowledge through perception. Desire is explained to be a movement beyond our need that leads us to a reality that we see as a source of possible satisfaction. This disjunct is summarizing the idea that desire is only seen as something “good” when it is used in a disciplined way and follows reason. The second disjunct of the premise assumes that the meaning behind the phrase “desire ought to follow reason” is “good” for the human person. “Good” is explained to be that which conforms to the moral ideal and is a fundamental normative concept. This disjunct is concluding that desire is a beneficial trait when it is used in moderation with moral judgement and reason, and it can produce morally “good” satisfaction.
The second premise implied by Jensen explains that reason should never follow desire. Jensen goes as far as saying that one’s mental house is “disturbed” if this scenario plays out in one’s mind or actions. Further, this is implying that rationalization infers a person’s “disturbed” mental house. He is not saying that we should not consult our emotions, instead he is saying we should consult our emotions and reason them out morally before acting on any emotion or desire. The movement of morality progresses when our reason is intact and not following emotions or desire, which is the “good” path to follow. It begins with the good in the world that passes to reason, which perceives the good and evil, and then the emotions finally pursue the good presented to them by our reason. The premise is deciding against the idea that our emotions would induce reason to find value that corresponds with our desire, which is the opposite of what is “good” for the human soul.
Jensen states in the conclusion, which follows earlier premises, that when there is an argument about reason and desire we should understand “reason should never follow desire” because this rationalization “disrupts” our mental capacities. In the same way, “desire ought to follow reason” so that we remain rational. The argument being made is inferring that we will harvest the “good” from our desires when they are reasoned out rationally by reason.
Argument Evaluation
Jensen’s argument from the passage is deductively valid, and is backed up by his premises. The first premise includes very broad terminology and would be more applicable and specific if Jensen went into more definitive language when referring to desire. There are different levels of desire, so leading into the second premise it would be better understood if there was clarification of the quality of desire so that the reader understands the reference of this premise being to higher quality desires, not simple desires. If this is true, then Jensen should consider better defining the word “disturbance” when referring to the mental capacities of a person balancing moral reason and desire. I feel as though someone would not be considered “disturbed” if they simply choose one food choice over the other, assuming both choices were of equal benefit to the person. This draws back to the quality of desire, which is crucial when deciphering desire and reason’s relationship.