An evaluation of nativism towards explaining cognitive development
The idea of nativism can be traced back as far as Plato in Ancient Greece, who believed that our experiences are incomplete and not sufficiently reliable to form knowledge, and that knowledge must, therefore, exist at the point of conception (Richardson, 1998). He called this Poverty of Stimulus. His idea has developed over centuries into becoming one extreme of the on-going debate of nature versus nurture. Today, nativism is the belief that knowledge and cognitive development is a result of innate modules rather than external acquisition (Spelke, 1998). The biggest change is perhaps that Plato believed God was responsible for innate knowledge rather than genetics. The beliefs and arguments of nativists are formed in order to answer extremely important questions such as whether children know about certain objects before contact with them, or what amount of contact influences their knowledge and how much knowledge is universal rather than cultural. Views such as nativism, empiricism and interactionism all attempt to answer the on-going debate and, although research has developed dramatically in these areas in the last century, there is still no definitive answer. This essay focuses on nativism. We will look at different theories, in particular relation to language and perception, and evaluate the nativist view of development in these areas.
When it comes to language, nativists believe that humans are biologically programmed to acquire language (Shaffir & Kipp, 2010). One area nativists highlight as evidence of innate programming is the universal stages or milestones of language acquisition amongst children. Despite different intelligence levels, experiences and culture, children tend to reach the same linguistic milestones at the same age. Known to nativists as linguistic universals, they see these as proof of an innate ability rather than a learned one (Pinker, 1991). In 1959, Noam Chomsky developed his Theory of Language. When children are learning to talk, they often make up their own chatter, using incorrect words or jumbled up sentences to express themselves. According to Chomsky, if language was learned through imitation of those around them (as per empiricist theories), children would speak correctly from the beginning. He suggested this was due to mental organs which humans use in cognition, also known as modules (Spelke, 1994). Following from Chomsky’s theory, there has been an increase in models highlighting innate rules through evolution and natural selection (Richardson, 1998). Computers became the metaphor for nativists demonstrating innate knowledge and reasoning (Richardson, 1998). Fodor (1983) is one of the theorists behind this who suggests the idea of a computational module, whose output is linked to genetic instruction, and guides how information is analysed, rearranged and recalled (Richardson, 1998). Learning and experience tends not to come into the equation as cognitive development is seen by nativists as the growth of cognitive rules and programmes (Richardson, 1998). Even where innate knowledge is not assumed, nativists such as Dan Slobin (1985) believe in specialised cognitive and perceptual abilities for language. Termed ‘language-making capacity’, Slobin believed these abilities enable children to analyse speech and work out the relationship between phonics, semantics and syntax (Spelke, 1998). Using these understandings, children then create their own theory which guides their attempts to communicate and which develops until adulthood is reached (Spelke, 1998). Therefore, as long as there is input, language acquisition is automatic. Gardner (1984) thought that development occurs along canalised avenues which have been planned genetically (Richardson, 1998).
Study of the human brain has given nativists further evidence for their language theories. Damage to areas of the brain thought to be responsible for language results in a loss of language functions (Merritt, 2008). Depending on the area affected, patients have been known to lose the ability of speech, whilst comprehension remains unaffected, or keep comprehensible speech but not be able to understand others (Martin, 2003). Research has also shown that speech sounds and non-speech sounds encourage different reactions to each side of a babies brain (Shaffir & Kipp, 2010). It has also been suggested before children get to puberty, their brains are not yet specialised in linguistics. Lennerberg (1967) suggested that it is therefore easier for children to learn languages (Shaffir & Kipp, 2010). His theories were backed up by cases where children who had lost at least one language function could recover these without special therapy. Adults, on the other hand, could not.
If, as nativists suggests, human cognitive abilities are genetic, then signs of this should be present at birth. The challenge is trying to find evidence of this in infants. In more recent years, researchers have been trying to understand more about the nature of cognitive abilities by studying babies as young as a few hours old, using techniques such as the recovery of habituation and preferential looking tests. In the former, infants are shown an image. They look at the image for a while and when they become uninterested, they have ‘habituated’ the stimulus. The picture is then taken away and shown again. The infant looks at it but for a shorter time. This keeps getting repeated and it has been found that the time the infant takes an interest in the image decreases. When a new image is then shown, the infant looks at it for as long as it did the first image. They have then been ‘dishabituated’. Preferential looking is where pictures are shown simultaneously and the time spent looking at each picture is measured. Kellman and Spelke (1983) used these tests to show that four month olds have an inherent understanding of what an object is (Spelke, 1994). These tests have also been used to show that babies have a preference to human faces over other objects and that they are born with innate interpersonal abilities (Shaffir & Kipp, 2010). This is not the only early cognition found in infants. Studies have shown evidence for object representation in infants (Spelke, 1998). Empiricists such as Baillargeon (1993) believe that a child learns about objects through interaction and exploration with them (Spelke, 1994). Although the perception of object boundaries is less than in adults, infants as young as three months have been found to perceive boundaries of objects that are adjacent to each other as long as they are different in depth (Spelke, 1998). Given that infants that young are not able to move or hold these objects to explore them, nativists see this as evidence against the empiricist views.